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Paolo Bozzi (1930–2003), an Italian experimental psychologist and philosopher, 
was one of the most brilliant exponents of experimental phenomenology. His 
scientific and theoretical contributions to vision sciences, cognitive psychology 
and philosophy of perception are original and wide ranging. Moreover, his 
reflections and experimental findings are well expressed in an accessible and 
inspiring style, and can be attractive not only for academic readership but also 
for a wider one.
Prior to this anthology, the majority of Paolo Bozzi’s publications (about 100 
articles, book chapters and monographs) had not been translated into English, 
except for a few papers, and he is still not as well-known internationally as he 
should be, except to the scholars who have met and appreciated him. This edited 
volume, conceived by Ivana Bianchi (University of Macerata, Italy) and Richard 
Davies (University of Bergamo, Italy), is therefore welcome, as it translates and 
introduces part of the work of Paolo Bozzi to a wider world.
This book not only attempts to give a better appraisal of the historical and scien-
tific profile of Paolo Bozzi in the history of psychology and epistemology of per-
ception but also aims to place his thinking in the light of recent progress in vision 
sciences and cognitive psychology. For this reason, the editors of the present an-
thology invited a team of scholars, experimental psychologists and philosophers 
to provide commentary for each article included, showing that it is possible to 
conduct productive and fertile dialog between contemporary vision scientists and 
epistemologists around Bozzi’s insightful and fruitful ideas.
The main fundamentals of experimental phenomenology itself – regarded as a 
natural science of perception, as Bozzi states – are still relevant topics of dis-
cussion, as evinced by many publications, for example, the reprint volume by 
Thinès, Costall and Butterworth, Michotte’s Experimental Phenomenology of Per-
ception (2014), Albertazzi’s Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology (2013), the 
new edition of Don Ihde’s Experimental Phenomenology: Multistabilities (2012) 
and Niveleau and Métraux’s The Bounds of Naturalism: Experimental Constraints 
and Phenomenological Requiredness. In addition, as noted by Maurizio Ferraris in 
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his commentary on Phenomenal Experience, Epistemic Experience and Psychological 
Experience (p. 76),
“the last book on which Hilary Putnam was working before his death in 
2016 focused on perception (and he claimed that, unless one understands 
that, one cannot understand anything in philosophy), or that the title of 
the most recent book by John Searle, Seeing Things as They Are could have 
appeared half a century ago from Paolo Bozzi’s pen, so innovative was he 
as to seem out of joint with his times”.
The anthology presents a selection of 18 previously published papers and chapters 
of his main books, Fisica ingenua [Naïve Physics] (Garzanti, Milan, 1990) and 
Fenomenologia sperimentale [Experimental Phenomenology] (Il Mulino, Bologna, 
1989), only three of which were originally published in English. The selections 
are thematically grouped into four parts, plus a section of afterthoughts at the end 
of the book, in which Paolo Bozzi illustrates his original contributions to the the-
oretical and methodological assumptions of gestalt psychology and experimental 
phenomenology.
The goal of experimental phenomenology, states Paolo Bozzi, “is to build a the-
ory of perception that is empirically grounded, which is to say naturalistically 
respectful of the events that it takes as its proper subject” (p. 81). The object 
of experimental phenomenology, in comparison to alternative perceptual theo-
ries, is “phenomenal experience”, that is, “what is directly under observation”. 
Phenomenal experience has to be distinguished from epistemic experience (i.e. 
the kind of experience described by means of instruments and measurements, 
generally taken as the realm of facts that are truly real, beyond all the factors due 
to the imperfections of the human senses) and psychological experience (i.e., 
individuals’ psychological experience, the psychism of each of us). Paolo Bozzi’s 
original contribution is to ground the theoretical bases for a science of observ-
ables iuxta propria principia, independent of any type of physical reductionism 
or neuroreductionism. A crucial principle in this direction is also to draw a clear 
distinction between seeing and thinking, i.e., the distinction between what we 
see and what we know about what we see, without falling into the different 
variants of stimulus errors.
From a methodological point of view, on the other hand, the scientific aim of 
experimental phenomenology is to discover structural laws of experience by the 
systematic and controlled variation of a phenomenal variable as a function of an-
other phenomenal variable. In other words, independent variables (for instance, 
the angles subtended by the two arrows in the Müller-Lyer illusion) and depen-
dent variables (the apparent difference in length of the two parallel lines) are 
both individuated on a perceptual level. While the first three parts of the book 
collects papers aimed at giving a theoretical and methodological background of 
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experimental phenomenology, the last part presents a selection of the scientific 
discoveries made by Bozzi. They regard the phenomenological analysis of pen-
dular harmonic motion and the conditions for “natural” motion along inclined 
planes (studies that now are known as part of a research area called naïve physics), 
directionality as a new factor of perceptual grouping, two factors of unification 
for musical notes: closeness in time and closeness in tone (he was also a passion-
ate violinist and an esteemed musical composer), observations on some cases of 
phenomenal transparency with line drawings, original observations on certain 
characteristics of afterimages and the perception of tertiary qualities.
I will focus on the last subject, tertiary qualities, to give a taste of the contem-
porary importance of Bozzi’s theory. “Perceptual events” – says Bozzi, referring 
to the gestaltists and also to Michotte’s paradigm of phenomenal causality and 
to the Gibsonian concept of affordance – “are always the vehicles of “expressive” 
or “tertiary” qualities, that is they always convey meaning”. “A sound or a face 
may be aggressive, a melody like a dish may be sweet, a thing may provoke fear 
or attraction” (p. 410). Not only faces or anthropomorphic bodies but even sim-
ple geometrical shapes, since Heider & Simmel’s demonstration (1944), despite 
their inanimate character, can express aliveness, emotions and intentional attri-
butes by virtue of their motion. In recent years, there have been a wide range of 
experimental results related to the perception of animacy and intentionality from 
motion cues, which have given a strong psychophysical and neurophysiological 
support to this view, demonstrating that the impression of aliveness and mean-
ingfulness of these events is surprisingly vivid, immediate and compelling and 
that they are strongly related to low-level visual processing, despite the seemingly 
higher level impressions they prompt. According to several authors, we perceive 
animacy and intentionality automatically, in the same manner that we perceive 
spatial depth or optical-geometrical illusions (see Wagemans, van Lier, & Scholl, 
2006; Parovel, Guidi, & Kreß, 2018; Scholl & Gao, 2013 for a review).
More generally, in my opinion, the power and timelessness of experimental 
phenomenology, a line of thought that Bozzi traces back to Goethe and Kant, 
and even to Plato and Aristotle (see Costall, p. 424), is the fact of being focused 
on the empirical knowledge of the perceptual world, the real world of our liv-
ing experience hic et nunc. Even if perhaps we refuse to believe this, it is still a 
mysterious world, about which, paradoxically, we know little. Kanizsa’s triangle 
(Kanizsa was Bozzi’s mentor), one of the most experimentally and neurophysi-
ologically explored perceptual phenomena, was not known before 1955; in the 
same way, stroboscopic motion, with all its cinematographic applications, was 
not even conceivable two centuries ago.
“What I’m emphasising is that our knowledge covers only about 10% of the 
properties present in the world that surrounds us and that the remaining  
GESTALT THEORY, Vol. 41, No.1
82 Bookreview - Buchbesprechung
90% has still to be discovered. If we do not seek, we shall not find. These 
are the kind of facts that physiology will have to explain, and not a simpli-
fied perceptual world that simply does not exist. This more complex world 
is what has to be explained by informatics or by the different branches of 
the neurological sciences, because this is the real world of vision, not that 
impoverished and approximate world that we carry in our heads as our 
image of visual reality” (Bozzi, 412).
Many recent works, both in the area of artificial vision and informatics, and 
in neurophysiology, testify to the strong need for these disciplines to face the 
phenomena themselves, by correlating phenomenological observations with 
psychophysical measurements and neurophysiological recordings (see for 
instance Spillmann, 2009; Reeves & Pinna, 2017). Examples of these include 
neural–network computer models that have to be fooled by optical illusions and 
other “illusory” contextual phenomena like humans (Mély, Linsley, & Serre, 
2018), and algorithms and neural models that can recognize emotions from 
body expression (de Gelder, 2017) to be applied in human–robot interaction.
As optical illusions, Gestalt effects in general, and even emotional and expressive 
qualities of events, are no more to be considered a bug of the visual system, or 
the results of high-level judgments and categorizations based on visual input, 
but structural laws of visual processing itself (Firestone & Scholl, 2016). These 
dimensions of the visual field cannot be ignored in an interdisciplinary organic 
approach to vision science but have to be recognized and appreciated in all their 
richness and complexity. Most of them are still awaiting to be discovered.
The reviewer hopes that this anthology will further encourage the growing and 
fruitful connections between experimental phenomenology – too often consid-
ered the younger sister – and other scientific approaches to human perception.
Giulia Parovel, Siena
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